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The original was posted on /r/Superstonk by /u/spacefyre on 2023-06-26 10:11:17+00:00.

I was reading about the Volkswagen short squeeze this weekend because I wanted to know what Porsche’s positioning was like prior to the price going parabolic. Here is what I found.

Volkswagen ordinary shares owned:

  • 42.6% by Porsche

  • 20% by Lower Saxony

Volkswagen call options owned:

  • 32% of cash settled options by Porsche

Short % of the float:

  • 12%

Therefore, the total long exposure, assuming call options will be exercised, was 94.6%. This means there was only 5.9% of shares remaining in the market, and with a short interest of 12%, it created a 6.1% short seller overage. This is what caused the price to squeeze because shorts could not exit without Porsche or Lower Saxony selling shares, or exiting their call position. These two entities effectively corned the market in VW shares, but with a limited time window because of the call options and their shrinking days-to-expiry.

Now, lets compare this to the Gamestop.

Using the numbers from computershared.net we can see the following:

Gamestop shares owned as of May 29th, 2023:

  • 15% institutions

  • 12% mutual funds

  • 10% ETFs

  • 13% insiders

  • 5% insiders stagnant

  • 17.1% Pure DRS

  • 10.9% DirectStock

  • .1% operational efficiency

The total % of shares long Gamestop, excluding call options (negligible), is 81.6%. If you exclude options from the VW short squeeze, their total was 62.6%.

I think options, because of their time decay, forced Porsche’s hand to exit early. They wanted to make sure they sold their calls for a profit, before the market realized if they waited X number of days the calls would expire and Porsche would no longer have the squeeze. I think because Gamestop shareholders have virtually zero call options there will be no limited time window forcing an exit, so it can theoretically go on forever, as long as shareholders don’t sell. This is what will be the difference between the VW squeeze and the Gamestop MOASS.

Considering that Gamestops remaining float is 18.6% and that the reported short interest is 20%, we have already taken the first step into MOASS territory. Gamestops short seller overage is 1.4%, Volkswagens was 6.1%. This means that right now, shorts cannot close as long as nobody sells. If investors continue to buy up more Gamestop shares, it makes it exponentially worse for short sellers and further increases the probability of an even wilder MOASS. There is no time decay of options that will give power back to short sellers. The genie is already out of the bottle, we have passed the point of no return, diamond hands forever, runic glory for all, Buckle up.

So what’s next?

I am telling everyone I know about Gamestop and no longer relying on reddit to spread the message. From what I see, ever since the new rules came in place, like anti-brigading and no cross-posting, the user growth rate of Superstonk has dropped off substantially. I think this is directly correlated to the drop off in DRS growth rate. This is why I am telling everyone I know, off the internet, about Gamestop.

Epilogue

You will have noticed that there are two categories of DRS for Gamestops total % of shares owned, Pure DRS and DirectStock. Pure DRS is when you have whole shares, no fractionals, are not enrolled in the dividend reinvestment program, do not have reoccurring buys setup or limit orders placed, and do not have any plan shares. DirectStock is when you do. The difference between the two is that theoretically brokers can use Directstock to their advantage by borrowing those shares for shorts. If you want to find out more, search “heat lamp” in the library of DD found here SuperStonk Library of DD, Art Books, and Periodicals (fliphtml5.com). This DD reminds me of the DD we used to see on Superstonk, but for some strange reason, never see anymore…

*cough*censorshipbecauseitscriticallyimportant*coughcough*