Consumer Protection in an Online World: An Analysis of Occupational Licensing - American Economic Association
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Consumer Protection in an Online World: An Analysis of Occupational Licensing by Chiara Farronato, Andrey Fradkin, Bradley J. Larsen and Erik Brynjolfsson. Published in volume 16, issue 3, pages 549-79 of American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, July 2024, Abstract: We study the demand and supp...
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The original was posted on /r/science by /u/smurfyjenkins on 2024-09-03 03:23:51+00:00.

Original Title: More stringent occupational licensing is associated with less competition, higher prices, and no increase in demand or consumer satisfaction. Customers often care more about a professional’s reviews than the professional’s licensing status.