PURPOSE OF THIS POST

This post is meant to provide clarity regarding the classification of Legacy Programs and their activities. In recent congressional hearings, it was stated that declassifying much of this information is up to the Executive Branch. In this post, I’d like to explain how antiquated legislation and overclassification of atomic energy research and development has resulted in the National Security Council having ultimate control of the topic. I was inspired by recent works like Seabritain’s recent masterpiece on the CIA, Chris Sharp’s article about crash retrieval, and Lester Nare’s recent tweets about the Executive Branch holding all the cards. I also found the hearings to be incredible, and I’ll do a post on that soon.

Atomic Energy Act of 1946

After WWII, there was a push to replace the defense-oriented management of atomic energy by empowering civilian involvement. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and placed oversight of atomic research and development under civilian control. The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) was established to legislate and regulate atomic energy until 1977.

The AEA of 1946 introduced the “Restricted Data” label for sensitive atomic R&D, for usage by the Atomic Energy Commission. This label predates Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential as the US classification system was established in 1951 via EO 10290. This loophole allowed the AEC to facilitate sensitive R&D outside of the infrastructure established by the National Security Act of 1947, keeping the most sensitive elements out of the purview of the Executive Branch.

The AEA of 1946 allowed Manhattan Project participants to join the AEC without re-clearance, serving as a landing spot for sensitive components of the Manhattan Project. Shortly after its creation, the AEC’s role expanded beyond atomic power to include managing broader scientific activities relevant to national security, such as storing translated Soviet science journals on physics, materials, and more at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

The AEC established 2 committees of great import that enabled this transition, and I will visit those committees later in this post. More details can be found at this link about the history of the AEC.

National Security Act of 1947

The National Security Act of 1947 established greater executive control over US defense and intelligence operations by creating the National Military Establishment (NME), later renamed the Department of Defense (DoD), along with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Council (NSC), and other authorities. The foundation laid would go on to empower centralization of STEM research and development through authorities like the National Science Foundation (NSF), founded in 1950.

Executive Order 10290 of 1951

On September 24, 1951, President Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 10290. This established the US govt classification system. It was titled: Prescribing regulations establishing minimum standards for the classification, transmission, and handling, by departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, of official information which requires safeguarding in the interest of the security of the United States. However, this Executive Order made a point to protect the existing usage of “Restricted Data” by the AEC.

c. Special statutory use of term “Restricted Data.” The term “Restricted” as used herein shall not be confused with the term “Restricted Data,” defined in the Atomic Energy Act of August 1, 1946 (60 Stat. 766, c. 724, sec. 10(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. sec. 1810(b)(1)) as follows:

Executive Order 10501 of 1953

On November 5, 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10501: Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of the United States. This order overhauled the classification system, refining the use of Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. EO 10501 also caused the revocation of Truman’s EO 10290. However, just like its precursor, it made a point to restate and protect the precedents set for atomic related “Restricted Data”.

Sec. 13. “Restricted Data” as Defined in the Atomic Energy Act. Nothing in this order shall supersede any requirements made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of August 1, 1946, as amended. “Restricted Data” as defined by the said act shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended, and the regulations of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Atomic Energy Act of 1954

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 amended AEA 1946 in a few important ways. On its face, it allowed the Executive Branch to access sensitive data it didn’t have before by establishing new oversight for the “Restricted Data” classification that the AEC had been using. AEA 1954 created a doorway for the Director of the CIA to remove Restricted Data from the AEC’s jurisdiction and control and reclassify it as “Defense Information” under section 102 d of the National Security Act of 1947, which ultimately names the National Security Council as final authority. The AEC’s military liaison committee was helpful in this process.

AEA 1954 - Public Law 83-703 on August 30th, 1954 - The Commission shall remove from the Restricted Data category such information concerning the atomic energy programs of other nations as the Commission and the Director of Central Intelligence jointly determine to be necessary to carry out the provisions of section 102 d of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and can be adequately safeguarded as defense information. (Page 941, Section 142 e)
NSA 1947 - Public Law 80-253 on July 26th, 1947 - For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council. (Page 498, Section 102 d)

This legislation allowed for international atomic proliferation via the recently established centralized authority for all things STEM research, development, and appropriations: the National Science Foundation (NSF). During this time, strategic planning for initiatives like the International Geophysical Year were already underway, as well as research related to institutional computing facilities, high energy accelerators, reactors, and more.

Transclassified Foreign Nuclear Information

This is where it gets convoluted. There is an international component at the heart of how some Legacy Programs were hidden from proper oversight. This allowed components of the Legacy Programs to develop beyond domestic markets and oversight.

Let’s revisit the excerpt from AEA 1954: “The Commission shall remove from the Restricted Data category such information concerning the atomic energy programs of other nations as the Commission and the Director of Central Intelligence jointly determine to be necessary”.

This ability to steer the proliferation of sensitive information and technology, powers delegated to the CIA Director and ultimately the National Security Council, allowed unchecked compartmentalization and stove piping that would morph uncontrollably as time went on. The technological and industrial development of the world has benefitted from global economic cohesion. The need for international cooperation is evident, but one can see how it would be abused with a lack of Congressional oversight and accountability.

This becomes clear when analyzing the overclassification issue related to the Department of Energy’s control of Transclassified Foreign Nuclear Information (TFNI) and how the exemptions it affords could be abused. TFNI that has been removed from the Restricted Data category for use by the IC is safeguarded as NSI under EO 13526. Documents marked …

Content cut off. Read original on https://old.reddit.com/r/UFOs/comments/1gtokes/the_executive_branch_has_all_control_uapda_review/

The Executive Branch Has All Control. UAPDA Review Board Is Not Enough.